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Nov. 10, 1955.]

GlUFFI'l'H COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v.
SAN DIEGO COLLEGE FOR WOMEN (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Arbitration-Award- Vacation- Impeachment- Evidence.
-Although an arbitrator cannot impeach an award by testifying to his fraud or misconduct, his testimony is admissible to
show what matters were submitted for decision and were
considered by arbitrators.
[2] !d.-Award-Vacation-Impeachment-Evidence.-A dissenting arbitrator may testify as to bias, partiality or other misconduct of arbitrators who rendered the award.
[3] !d.-Arbitrators and Proceedings-Consultation With Outsiders.-It is proper for arbitrators to obtain from disinterested persons of acknowledged skill such information and
advice in reference to technical questions submitted to them as
may be necessary to enable them to come to correct conclusions,
provided that the award is result of their own judgment after
obtaining such information.
[4] !d.-Arbitrators and Proceedings - Consultation with Outsiders.-An arbitrator who has formed a tentative opinion of
his own with regard to a dispute submitted to arbitration may
properly talk the matter over with an attorney to check his
legal conclusions, where there is no showing that such attorney
is not a disinterested person.
[5] Id. -Arbitrators and Proceedings- Consultation With Outsiders.-All arbitrators need not act as a body when seeking
independent advice.
[6] Id.-Award-Vacation-Findings.-The trial court's refusal to
vacate an arbitration award for alleged misconduct of an arbitrator in arriving at his decision through work of an "outside
attorney" is an implied finding that it believed such arbitrator's
affidavit that his opinion was reached through his own independent thought and was not that of any other person.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 41; Am.Jur., Arbitration and A ward, § 135 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arbitration and Award, § 31; Am.Jur., Arbitration and Award, § 111.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Arbitration, § 45; [3-5) Arbitration, § 21.1; (6, 14] Arbitration, § 43; [7] Appeal and Error,
§ 1298; [8, 9] Appeal and Error, § 1299; [10-12, 20] Arbitration,
§ 24; [13] Arbitration, § 22; [15, 17] Arbitration, § 25; [16]
Damages, § 13; (18] Arbitration, § 32; [19] Arbitration, § 37.1.

[7] Appeal--Questions of Law and Fact - Evidence to Support
Orders.~An appellate court will not disturh implied flndings
of faet made
trial 0ourt in support of an order, and when
evidence is
it will be presumed that the court found
every fact necessary to support its order that evidence would

[8] !d.-Questions
Law and Fact-Where Evidence is Documentary.--In considemtiou of an order made on affidavits inof a
of
an appellate court is
where oral testimony is presented
for review.
[9] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Where Evidence is Documentary.- Where an issue is tried on affidavits, the rule on
appeal is tlwt those affidaYits favoring a eontention of the
party establish not only the facts stated therein but
also all
which reasonably may be inferrNl therefrom, and
where there is snbstantinl conflict in thP facts stated, a determination of controverted facts by the tri:1l court will not be
disturbed.
[10] Arbitration-Award-Signature - Persons Present.- Wherr
one of the three arbitruto\'s announced his rt>fusal to sign an
award and that he would dissent therefrom, it was not necessary that he be present when the oth(>r two arbitrators signed.
[11] Id.-Award-Signatm:e---Mode.- Where chairman of arbitration board of three members a:sked onP of the other arbitrator:;
who adhered to decision preYiousJy reached, the third arbitrator having dissented, to prepare n formal award since he
was an attoruey, and such attorney prepared and signed the
award :md delin•red it
nwssPili.ter to the chnirman's ofllee
whrre it was signt;d, having been previously ncknowledged in
surh
office. the mode in which the chairman signed
tlw award, though not. approved practice, will not justify
asi<le thE~ award in absence of a showing that thP
complaining party wns prejudiced.
[12] Id.-Award--DBlivery to Parties.-A rule of the Standard
Form of Arbitration Pnll1edure of the American Institute of
Architects
delivery of an award simultaneously to
each p:uty was
complied witb, where the chairman of arbitration board of three members received thP
award which had hccu sig·ned and acknowledged by one of
otlwr nrhitratrn·s, shortly thereafter he received a telephonP
caiJ from
attonwys and had his secretary dictate
award to such attorneys' secretnry. thPr(•after he called defendnnt's attorney and announecd that the a ward had been
signPd
him and tlw other arbitrator, the third arbitrator
<li~sented thPrefrom, nn<l thert'fl fter
cop:v of the

[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error,
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award was delivered to the dissenting arbitrator cUHI the
original mailed to defendant's attorney, it therefore
that each party was notified at the e11rliest possible opportunity and as nearly simultaneously as could be expected.
[13] !d.-Arbitrators and Proceedings-Reopening Case for Further Testimony.---The chanman of an arbitration board of
three members was not guilty of miseonduct in
dissenting arbitrator's motion to reopen the case to
additional evrdence where, at the time motior1
made, such
arbitrator made no ofl'er of
and where thP
complaining party does not
what eolllpetent and materinl
evidence was excluded by reason of denial of the motion or that
the chairman and third arbitrator were
of abuse of
discretion.
[14a, 14b] !d.-Award-Modification or Vacation.-The merits of
a controversy between parties to an arbitration
are
not subject to judicial review.
[15] Id.-Award-Scope.--Unless specifically requirNl to act in
conformity with rules of law, arbitrators may base their
decision on broad principles of justice and
and in
so may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that the party
might successfully have asserted in judicial aetion.
[16] Damages-Rule as to Certainty.-Uncertainty as to the fact
of damage, that is, as to nature, existence or eansC' of damage,
is fatal to a recovery.
[17] Arbitration-Award-Compliance and Coextensiveness With
Submission.--An arbitration award is coextensive with the
issues submitted where it appears that the arbitration board
heard and determined (adversely to defendant)
to
a statement of issues presented by plaintiff on a designated
date, and on subsequent dates heard and considered evidC'nce
of both parties with respect to such mntter.
[18] Id.-Award-Presumptions.-lt must be presumed that all
matters within a submission to arbitration wen• laid before
arbitrators and passed on by them. (Code Civ. Proc., ~ 1963.
subd. 18.)
[19] !d.-Award-Court Review.-Under the arhitrntion statute,
both superior and appellate eourts must give every intendment
of validity to an arbitration award, and the burdPn is on one
claiming error to support h1s claim.
[20] Id.-Award-Requisites.--The fact that a formal arbitration
award was prepared by one of three arbitrators •.d10 wm; an
attorney does not show that the n ward was thn t of ~uch
attorney rather than of the arbitrntion panel, \\"IJ"n' til;• l'ormnl
award merely followed an opinion
by chau·t11an of
panel in which such attorney concurred.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of I,os
Angeles County and from orders denying motion to vacate an
arbitration award and granting motion to confirm award.
William R. McKay, Judge. Affirmed.
Proceeding to confirm an arbitration award. Judgment confirming award, affirmed.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Ira C. Powers and Richard L.
Wells for Appellant.
Bodkin, Breslin & Luddy, Martin & Mahedy and O'Neill P.
Martin for Respondent.
Joseph Scott as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
CARTER, J .-A rehearing was granted in this case so that
plaintiff's supplemental reply brief might be considered by
this court. We have examined said brief and find nothing
therein which compels any change in our decision as heretofore
filed.
Plaintiff Griffith Company appeals from an order denying
its motion to vacate an arbitrators' award and from a judgment entered on an order confirming the award in favor of
defendant college.
A construction contract entered into between the parties
provided for the erection of certain college buildings for
defendant by plaintiff on a cost plus and maximum price
basis. The contract provided that all disputes subject to
arbitration should be settled by arbitration under the ''Standard Form of Arbitration Procedure of the American Institute
of Architects.'' The work was delayed beyond the date set
for substantial completion and a dispute arose. Plaintiff
demanded arbitration and eventually an arbitration panel was
agreed upon: Mr. McKittrick, a contractor, was named by
the plaintiff; Mr. J. Howard Ziemann, an attorney, was
named by the defendant; and the two nominees selected the
third, Paul B. Young, as chairman. After several hearings
at which evidence and briefs were considered, Mr. Young, as
chairman, with Mr. Ziemann concurring, agreed on an award
in defendant's favor. Mr. McKittrick dissented in a written
opinion in which he (among other things) accused Mr. Young
of not having arrived at his decision by his own independent
thought but through the work of an ''outside attorney,'' or,
in other words, of misconduct sufficient to justify setting aside
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as \Yell as those of Mr.
the award. Mr. McKittrick's
Young and Mr. Ziemann are on file.
[1] We said in Sapp v. Barenfeld, 34 Cal.2d 515, 523 [212
P .2d 2:33 J, that ''although an arbitrator cannot impeach the
avvard by testifying to his fraud or misconduct, his testimony
is admissible to show what matters were submitted for decision
and were considered by the arbitrators." This
apparently,
the general rule. In Commercial Arbitrations and A wards, by
it is said: '' "'\Vhile ordinarily an arbitrator may not
testify to his own acts of mistake or misconduct any more
than he may to those of the members of the arbitral board
generally, to establish a cause sufficient to defeat or vacate an
award, it has been held that the complaining party may take
such testimony of an arbitrator when it implicates the other
party in the alleged misconduct, partiality. bias. or corrupt
action.
[2] ''Again, in the case of a dissenting arbitrator, the
award not being his, it is uniformly held that he may testify
as to the bias, partiality or other misconduct of the arbitrators
who rendered the award in question the same as any other
witness.'' ( § 365, p. 787.)
McKittrick, the dissenting arbitrator, by affidavit, stated
that Mr. Young, prior to full discussion by the panel members.
had submitted the matter to an unnamed attorney who had
drafted an opinion; that Mr. Young, at a meeting, signed
the original and gave it and a copy thereof to McKittrick;
that Mr. Young and Mr. Ziemann desired then and there to
make an award but because of Mr. McKittrick's opposition.
agreed to a further meeting. At the next meeting, McKittrick
moved, on behalf of plaintiff, to reopen the proceedings to
permit further testimony on the "items of damage"; that the
motion was denied. It is also claimed that Mr. Young and
:\Ir. Ziemann did not sign the award in each other's presence;
that the acknowledgment of Mr. Young's signature was made
prior to the time he signed it; that the award was not delivered
simultaneously to all arbitrators; that the award went outside
the issues of the arbitration proceeding. It is also contended
that Mr. Young was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in refusing to reopen the proceedings to permit additional testimony
on the part of Mr. McKittrick.
Mr. Young's affidavit shows that he took his tentative
written opinion to the meeting with him; that it was in a
sealed envelope which was not opened nntil after fonr and
one-half hours of discussion between the three of them. It

16th; that
law and the facts. It is further stah·d that after hearing
the evidence and
the ljriefs. J\l;·
formed a
tentative
of his owll and that
attorney with whom
had
so that his
that "it was
not
con~erued ·'; that
erroneons so far as the
achised
attorney that his
was not
<)rronc011s.
to his secretary
from his Oi\'ll notes; that the
thereof was his own
ex~cpt for tlw eilations of
whieh he had obt ained from tl1e
<nvard of lhe arbitratd's iH.'l'C tlw result of affiant's own judgment aud that of said ,J.
Zicmanu.
'' 'l'hat
the course of the
affiant had informed both his fellow arb.itnnors that he intended to seck
legal coufirwation of whateYer
he might arrive at,
and no objectiou >Yas made
either."
Articlr 40 of tlle ag-reement between the
provides
that a11y
to arbitration shall be submitted to
arbitration in aecon1ance with the
of the Standard
l<'orm of Arbitration Proeed nre of The American Institute
of Architects and the"
arbitration la>Y."
It is
plaintiif that .l\lr. Young's conduct in
pri\·ately
an attorney constituted misconduct such
as would
the award. In
v. Barenfeld,
supra. 34 Cal.2d 516. 521,
the sar:1e point was
raised. We snid there: " [ T J he
to determine the
amount of tlie award, consulted ex parte with C. L. \Veek'O, a
skilled cost
for an estimate of the labor and material eost of
the drfccts. They ehech:ed his estimate
with several building
firms and adopted it in making
their award after this independent i1wcstigation. The award
was the result of the arbiirators' own judgment, based, however, on information
in this manner.
"There is no error in such procedure. Although a hearing
is required on disputrd questions of fact, arbitrators may
inform themseh·es further by
price lists,
examining materials and
cost estimates. (Sturges,
Commercial Arbitral ion
§ 217. p. 495.)
[3] This
Hlll.l' be PX parte, wiibont notiee or
hearing to the parties, for 'it is entirely proper for arbi-

trators,
obtain from disinterested
persons of
skill such information and advice in
reference to teehnical
submitted to them, as may be
necessary to enable them to eorne to eorreet conclusions,
that the U\Yard is the
of their own judgment
( 1 Meehem.
§ 810.
218 U. S.
198
of M. E.
; Dore v. Southern
P. 817] ; Simons v. Mills.
; Fogler v.
135 Cal. 83, 86
Inc. v. Bank
A.me1·ica,
[123 l)2d 942]; Gorcl v. Harmon
P.2d 1
; Liggett v. Torrington Bldg. Co., 114 Conn.
432 '158 A. 917]; Koepke v.
E. Liethen Grain Co., 20.} Wis. 75, 77 [236 N.W.
; Twin
Lakes Reservoir <f; Canal Co. v. Platt
Inc., 112 Colo.
155 [147 P.2d
Bank v.
Fire
Ins. Co., 85 :Me.
A. 991, 35 Am.St.Rep. 341].)
It is immaterial whether the
of the appraisal is the
only matter in
part of a broader submission.
( Gord v. Harmon &
~trg v. New England
Fish Co., 7 Wn.2d 509
Rrrngor
Rank
v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., stt.pra; Sturges, supra, §217, pp.
495-498.)" (See also
Inc. v. Roland, 121
Cal.App.2d 491, 494 [263 P.2d 445].)
[4] In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no good
reason why lVIr. Young should not have talked the matter
over with an attorney to check his legal conelusions. There
was no shmving made by plaintiff that the attorney was not a
disinterested person. [5] vVe made no requirement in the
Sapp case that all arbitrators must act as a body when seeking
independent advice and it would appear that such a requirement would be unnecessarily burdensome and could lead to
absurd results. [6] The conclusion of the trial court in
refusing to vacate the award is an implied finding that he
believed the affidavit of .Mr.
wherein it was stated that
his opinion was reached
thought
and was not that of any other person. [7] "An appellate
court will not disturb the implied findings of fact made by a
trial court in support of an order, any more than it will interfere with express findings upon which a final judgment is
predicated. \Vhen the evidence is com9ieting, it will be presumed that the court found every faet necessary to support

order that the
So far as it has
on the weight
evidence or the credibility of witnesses, its implied findings are conclusive. 'rhis rule is equall:·
applicable whether the evidence is oral or documentary.
[8] In the consideration of an ordrr made on affidavits involving the decision of a question of fact. the apprllate ·~onrt
is bound
the same rule as where oral testimony is pr,oscnted
for review. ' (4 Cal.Jur.2d § 614. p. 495; People v. Western
Meat
13 Cal.App. 539, 544 1110 P. 338]: Maselli v.
E. H. Appleby & Co., Inc., 117 Cal.App.2d 684. 638 [256 P.2d
618]; Jones v. Lindsey, 114 Cal.App.2d 237. 239 [250 P.2d
153] ; Schreiber v. Hooker, 114 Cal.App.2d 634, 640 [251 P.2d
55]; Paulekas v. Paulekas, 117 Cal.App.2d 73, 77 [254
P.2d 941] .) [9] When an issue is tried on affidavits, the rule
on appeal is that those affidavits favoring the contention of
the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein
but also all facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom,
and where there is a substantial conflict in the facts stated,
a determination of the controverted facts by the trial court
will not be disturbed. ( Ilay11tin v. Rndniclr, 115 Cal.App.2d
138. 140 [251 P.2d 707]. I
Paragraph 14 of the Standard Form of Arbitration provides that the award is to be made in writing and signed by
a majority of the arbitrators and that it shall be acknowledged when the prevailing law so requires. It is contended
by plaintiff that Mr. McKittrick was not permitted to participate in the making of the award, or to see a copy thereof,
and that the arbitration panel did not meet when the award
was made. Mr. Young's afiidavit shows that at the close of
the meeting when he opened his written opinion, he gave
copies thereof to each of the other arbitrators; that no award
was made that day, but a meeting was arranged for the following day; that he and Mr. Ziemann signed the opinion that
day; that the next day a meeting was had with Mr. Young
and Mr. Zeimann adhering to the conclusion previously
reached and Mr. McKittrick dissenting therefrom; that Mr.
Young asked Mr. Ziemann to prepare the formal award since
he was an attorney; that Mr. McKittrick said he would not
sign the award. It was further stated that a tentative meet.
ing was arranged for the following day to sign the award
but that Mr. Young was unable to be there because of another
business engagement; that Mr. Ziemann prepared and signed
the award and delivered it by messenger to Mr. Young's ofiice
where it was signed, having been previouslY acknowledged
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the notary in .Mr. Ziemann's office. [10] Plaintiff's contention is, apparently, that rule 14 (heretofore set forth)
required all the arbitrators to have been together at the
time the award was signed. Hule ] 4 does not specifleally so
require. Mr. MeKittriek had announced his refusal to sign
the award and that he would dissent therefrom. 'rhere
appears to be no reason why it was necesc-;ary that he be present when the other two arbitrators signed. It has been held
that the arbitrators, having met in consultation at the time
of their final decision of the case upon the merits. were not
required to meet again for the mere purpose of signing the
award. (Campbell v. Inhabitants of Upton, 113 Mass. 67, 71:
Robinson v. Bickley, 30 Pa. 384; Sturges, snpra, § 219,
p, 509.)
[11] Section 1287 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that the a>vard must be in writing and acknowledged or
proved in ''like manner as a deed for the conveyance of real
estate." While the manner in which Mr. Young signed the
award is not approved practice, plaintiff has not shown that it
was prejudiced thereby.
In Williston v. City of Yuba City, 1 Cal.App.2d 166, 169,
170 [36 P.2d 445], an acknowledgment \vas taken by an officer
out of the presence of the grantor. The court held : ''The
deed of conveyance was not invalid between the parties
thereto merely because it was not acknowledged by the grantors. The purpose of an acknowledgment to a deed is evidentiary in character and is required so as to entitle the
instrument to be recorded or to render it competent evidence
without further proof. (9 Cal.Jur. 113, § 18; Gordon v.
City of San Diego, 108 Cal. 264 [41 P. 301]; Knaugh v.
Baender, 84 Cal.App. 142 [257 P. 606]; Civ, Code, § 1161.)
The fact that the deed in this case was irregularly aclmowledged out of the presence of the grantors is immaterial except for the purpose of determining whether the grantors
intended to presently convey their title to the land therein
described when the deed was handed to .Mr. ·weis for the
purpose of delivering it to the grantee. There is sufficient
evidence in the record to support the finding of the court to
the effect that the deed was delivered by the grantors for the
purpose of conveying title to the property without any condition or contingency attached thereto and that the delivery
of the deed was absolute." (See also 1 Cal.Jur.2d, § 28,
p. 500.)
[12] Rule 14 of the Standard Form of Arbitration pro-
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vides that the
simultaneously to
affidavit shows that shortly before
each party. Mr.
4 p. m. on October
he receiYed the award which had been
signed and
by Mr. Ziemann; that shortly
thereafter he received a
call from plaintiff's attorneys
and that he had his secretary dictate the award to the attorneys'
; that thereafter he called defendant's attorney and announced that the award had been signed by
him and Mr. Ziemann; that thereafter a copy of the award
was delivered to Mr. McKittrick and the original mailed to
defendant's attorney [t appears, therefore. that each party
was notified at the earliest possible opportunity and as nearly
simultaneously as could be
Rule 14 was substantially complied with.
[13] It is next contended that Mr.
was guilty of
misconduct in
motion to reopen
for the purpose of
additional evidence. Rule 11
of the Standard Form provides that ''The hearing may be
reopened at any time before the award is required to be
made at the discretion of the arbitrators or upon the request
of a party for good cause shown.'' After Mr. Young had
disclosed his tentative
Me. McKittrick asked for a
continuance until the next day to give him an opportunity
to consult with ''his people.'' At the time set for the continuance he moved to reopen. He made no offer of proof by
affidavit. Rule 11 leaves the matter of reopening to the discretion of the arbitrators, or a majority thereof, and plaintiff has not shown what
and material evidence was
reason of the denial of its motion ( fl1 oore v.
excluded
G~·ifjith, 51 Ca1.App.2d
389
P.2d 900] ), or that
Mr. Young and Mr. Ziemann were guilty c1' an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff contends that the decision is arbitrary, harsh
and inequitable; that it is contrary to law; and that it is not
coextensive with the issues submitted.
[14a] The merits
of the controversy between the parties are not subject to
judicial review.
Oil Co1·p. v. C. S. T., Ltd.,
29 Cal.2d
233 [174 P.2d
; Kerr v. Nelson, 7 Cal.2c1
85 [59 P.2d 821] ; Loving ((: Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603
[204 P.2d 23]; 5 Cal.Jur.2d §52, p. 120.)
It was held in Crofoot v. Blair
Corp., 119 Cal.
App.2d 156, 165 [260 P.2d
, that" The opinion and award
of the arbitrator are the sole
to tbe
facts
upon these appeals. 'l'he court is not called upon to review

the award.''
The '

l)ir-.uo

n;.:n·~-'c!nent \rork
and t·hc eonstrnC"tion \\~as to
1 !L)l. 1'hr Co::~

for

tractor
aud material:;: f11rn ishr(l,
not to exerrd H;? 0fJ:'i .onn

[Wi'

i

lie Po>;t of the worh;

rent f'r•e, th~> total prier

no TlP
wns cid!!al!y not
completed nntil 0Ptnber i!f
·:ivmt 14 P10lltl's beyond
the eontractnal teri•1im11ion dnt <'. Ml rlw Con1 raetor 's t·ecords
indieate thitt th<' en,;i for inLqr »nd mn:erinl~ exeeeded the
1 "'
contrad price.
in til(" '11111 of $1:'12,239.58. In tl1is
the C'nJJinwtor "lle~<·e~ t·hat thP
the .iob. Rnd ren thP nnJrJwJt e~:penderl
sn Jted in
in excess of th0 contrar:t
:Jln~
in thf' sum of
$108J00.37. or trdal
in tiw snm of *2GrJA:?n 05
"Tlw Pvic1enee c1isr losr~ t hilt the nwnpr ren. ncstrd srvrra l
eoutraetor~ to hid •m lhc inb and thilt flriffith
ll,\' snbmitte(J tlw lrnvest birl.
Hn\\·en·r the 1dal amonnt of the
Griffith bicl PXf'<'('(ll'(l th0 ChnF•r\
and the Owner
.\rchitcr· (•Oliii':T''il with Grifllth
for
the pur,1osc of rli,CJi
e.c>rtain itrms in ordrr IP reduee
the total cost of thr
fter a
re had Leen rrachPrl.
whicli was
tn the Cl-wner. thr Arcbitret prepared
an addendum to 1he
forth lhe rlumgps
that were t!J be ma•tr. On pag·0 1 of nrldrnr1um 3. it is provirlrd tl1at:
" 'Ori;.dmll
will be rrYi~rd to i ncorporat0 the above
rhanges.'
''Both the O·wnrr ;:mel the Con1ndor \\'PrE' fearfnl that <:ertair material~ ;ni<e·ht nnt lw '' ilnh 1e nnl0ss the .ioh was
begun immediately because of the Korcall vvar whieh had just
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the Contractor
to go ahead
aml start the work without waiting for final working drawings incorporating the changes that were made with the
understanding that the drawings would be provided clnring the
progress of the work. The Owner offered evidence to prove
that the Architect had informed the Contractor that the
working drawings would not be completecl for six months.
This, the Contractor denies. Article 3 of the contract provides that:
" 'The Architect shan furnish with reasonable promptness. additional instructions, by means of drawing or otherwise, necessary for the proper execution of the work.'
"Actual construction on the job site began on August 8,
1950. A carpenters' strike prevented the Contractor from
obtaining skilled carpenters until September 7, 1950. The
Contractor introdured evidence to prove that because of
delays in obtaining plans the work progressed very slowly
during the first four months of the building operation. Consequently, on December 12. 1950, the Contractor wrote to the
Architect complaining of these delays and, among other
things, stated :
" 'Lack of plans and information will require us to take
more than three months to do work which normally should
require three weeks.
'' ' . . This type of operation is expensive and accomplishes little. . . .
'' 'At the present time lack of plans and information prevents us from starting any other units. . . . '
"In this letter the Contractor requested a conference with
the Owner, and such a conference was subsequently beld.
The subject matter of that conference is in dispute but,
thereafter, and on December 18, 1950, the Architect wrote
to the Contractor and stated that he believed that the conference had answered the problems raised in the letter of December 12. On December 19. 1950, the Owner granted the
Contractor a three months' extension of time within which
to complete the project. It should be noted no increase in
contract price was demanded or received by the contractors
at the time this Change Order was formalized.
"The Contractor's evidence indicates that the job was delayed throughout its entire life because of the Owner's failure
to promptly furnish plans and information necessary to the
Contractor. Some 52 Change Orders were executed, but
these are not included in the Contractor's claim since prices

:Jl3

executed.

to December L
the Contractor:;;
Order

introduced indicating
various Chang<'
was introduced inOrder for the
and details dnr-

"The Owner bas introduced evidence to prove that many
other
such as labor
material shortages, contractor
etc .. contributed to the over-all delay of the
job. The Chairman of the Board is of the opinion that all
of these faetors eontribntN1 in some
to delay the job.
"It is the Chairman of the Board's conctuswn that the
Contractor may not recover because, First. it did not comply
w·ith the provisions in the contract
to fhe filing of
claims, and, Second, he ·1s nnahlP to asc~rlam 1J)hat proportion
of the costs. over and abovP the r:rmtract pncc, is attributable
to the Owner's
and 1.chat
is attn:bntable to
other factors.
"First, he decides that Artiele 16 of the contract has no
application to these
That article is limited to
claims for extra costs caused
instructions. not
by the failure to
instructions. Article 31 of the contract
does apply. It provides that either party shall be reimbursed
for damages caused by the
" 'wrongful act or
of the other party, or of anyone employed by him.
" 'Claims under this clause shall be made in writing to
the party liable within a reasonable time at the first observance of ><neh damage, and not later than the time of final
payment . . .
"The letter of December 12, 1950, does indieate dissatisfaction with the manner in which
were furnished. The
letter also indicates that 'this type of
is expensive
and accomplishes little.' Bnt the letter does not specifically
register a claim. It requests a conference. Immediately after
the conference a three month extension of time was granted,
with no increase in c011i raet
and at least to some degree,
this extension of time was
ir·:.t0d npon the carpenters'
strike over which the Owner, of course, had no control.
4li
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written notice was
the Contractor
to the ~\rchitect or to the Owner directly.
There is evidence to indicate that many oral complaints were
made, but it is not unusual in a large construction operation for both the Architect and the Contractor to orally comto one another about the progress of some of the
work. In the
of the Chairman of the Board such
oral
would not put the Owner on notice of the
fact that his actions were
excessive costs whirh would
result in the assessment of damages against him. The purpose of Article 31 is to give the Owner notice so that he
may change his course of conduct if, in fact, that course of
eonduct will result in additional costs. I believe that the
Owner never bad this opportunity in this case.
"Moreover, the Contractor agreed to start the operation
without the customary working drawings usually available
at the outset of a job. There was bound to be some delay
because of this and, hence, the mere faet that the job was
being delayed would not in itself give the Owner notice that
his activities might be contributing to that delay.
"But irrespective of the question of liability, we cm£ld
not award damages in this case because the Contractor has
not established what proportion of the total damages were
due to the failure of the Owner to promptly furnish plans.
As I understand the law, this Board is not empowered to
arbitrarily assess damages. Article 1 (g) of the contract
provides that:
" 'The law of the place of the building shall govern the
construction of this contract.'
"Section 3300 of the California Civil Code provides that:
" 'For the breaeh of an obligation arising from contract,
the measure of damages . . . is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment z)roxitnately
caused thereby, or which in the ordinary course of things,
would be likely to result therefrom.' (Emphasis supplied.)
"Section 3301 provides:
" 'No damages can be recovered for a breach of contract
which are not rlrarly ascertainable in both their nature and
origin.' (Emphasis supplied.)
"In the case of Austin v. Roberts, 130 Cal.App. 328, 333
r2o P.2d 97], the Court stated:
" 'Conceding that plaintiff suffered a loss of profits, there
is no evidence showing what part of that loss was caused
by the wrongful acts of any of tl1e defendants and what part
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was caused by the sale of his property . . . . The burden of
making the proof rested on the plaintiff.' See also J. J.
Kelly Co. v. United States (Ct.Cl., 1947), 69 F.Supp. 117.
118.
''As a matter of fact Chairman of the Board concludes
that the execution of 52 Change Orders caused some delay
We also conclude that certain labor disputes, material shortages, difficulties with suppliers, and contractor delays contributed to some extent in the over-all delay in completing thE'
job. Since I was unable to ascertain what portion of the
over-all delay is attributable to these various factors I am
unable to determine the Contractor's damages, if any.
''The Chairman of the Board, therefore, recommends this
Board decide in favor of the defendant, SAN DIEGO CoLLEGE
FOR WOMEN, and against the plaintiff, GRIFFITH CoMPANY
Both parties shall pay their costs and Attorneys' fees."
This opinion was signed by Mr. Young and concurred in
by Mr. Ziemann. The award followed the recommendation
of the opinion.
It is at once obvious from a reading of the chairman's
opinion that it is not "arbitrary, harsh and inequitable" any
more than any other decision is so to the losing party. The
decision is argued to be contrary to law in that Mr. Young's
opinion sets forth that he was unable to ascertain what proportion of the damages was attributable to defendant's fault
and that he was therefore unable to determine the damages
proximately caused thereby to plaintiff.
[15] In Sapp v. Barenfeld, supra, 34 Cal.2d 515, 523,
we held : ''Arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in
conformity with rules of law, may base their decision upon
broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so may
expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might
successfully have asserted in a judicial action. ( Gerdetz v.
Central Oregon lrr. Co., 83 Ore. 576, 580 [163 P. 980] :
Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349 [198 N.Y.S. 462, 465] ;
Koepke v. E. Liethen Grain Co., 205 Wis. 75, SO [236 N.W
544].) The claim must be expressly raised at some time
before the award." The arbitrators in the instant case were
not specifically required to act in conformity with other
than the "prevailing arbitration law." In Crofoot v. Blair
Holdings Corp., supra, 119 Cal.App.2d 156. 189, it was held:
"Even if the arbitrator decided this point incorrectly, he did
decide it. The issue was admitted properly before him

that such a deit is an error of law,
not reviewable
It appears, however, from
Allen v. Gardner, 126
340 [272 P.2d 99],
that the chairman
not commit an error of law. [16] It
was there said: '
as to the fact of
that
as to the
the damage, is
fatal.
The chairman
specifically sets forth the
had not established
what proportion of
were due to the fault
of the defendant. It appears therefore that the nature, existence or cause of the
was uncertain.
[17] Plaintiff's contention that the award was not coextensive with the issues submitted is also without merit. It
appears from the record
's affidavit of November
6, 1953) "That said board of arbitrators heard and determined
(adversely to defendant) objections to the statement of issues
presented by plaintiff on
20, 1953, and heard and considered plaintiff's evidence in said matter on June 15th, June
22nd, June 23rd and June 24th, and defendant's evidence
15th and ,July 16th. . . . "
on July 13th, July 14th,
Plaintiff's contention appears to be an attempt to reargue
the issues and the evidence. [14b] As we have heretofore
stated, the merits of
eontroversy between the parties
are not subject to
review (Pacific Vegetable Oil
supra, 29 Cal.2d
. [18] "Jt
Corp. v. C. 8.
must be presumed ·That all matters withi11 . . . a submission
to arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed
upon by them.' (Code Civ.
1968, ,;ubd. 18.)" ( Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp, snpra, 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 192.)
[19] Further, "Under the 1927 statute, it is well settled
that both before the superior and appellate courts every intendment of
must be
the award and that the
burden is upon the one claiming error to support his contention. (Popcorn
Co. v. Page, 92 Ca1.App.2d
448 [207 P.2d 647].)" (Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp.,
supra, at page
[20] There is no merit to plaintiff's contention that the
award was not that of the arbitration panel bnt of :Mr
Ziemann. It is true that Mr. Ziemann,
an attorney.
prepared the formal award but that award merely followed
the opinion
by 1\Ir. Young in which Mr. Ziemann
concurred. It follows,
that the award was tbat of
a majority of the board of arbitration.

concnrred.

J .-'l'o me, tl
the
conclusion that the arbitratkn
the full
and fair and unbiased
to which the
were
entitled under the fundamental
of fair trial. To
hold that one
unknowll to his associates, may seek
1 he advice of an
and then use the opinion prepared
by that attorney as the award oJ' the arbitrators violates
every principle of fair trial. If arbitration is to have the
place in the administration of justice to which it is entitled,
it must be conducted in accordance with the same rules of
law which apply to judicial proceedings, insofar as the
integrity of decision is concerned.
attorney has never been
The identity of the
disclosed. For all that appears, he may have been a partisan
who acted with entirely
motives. Secret consultation by a judge with a lawyer who prepared his opinion for
him would meet with the unqualified disapproval of bench
and bar. I see no difference between that situation and the
one shown in this case.
For these reasons and those stated by Mr. Justice Ashburn
in the opinion upon which the District Court of Appeal
set aside the a1vard, (Cal.App.) 280 P.2d 203, I would make
the same order.
Appellant's nP<l~HWl for a
was denied December 8,
1955. Edmonds, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

